How long can Peruvian democracy endure?

“Instead of correcting its institutional weaknesses, Peru continues to deepen its crisis. A semblance of democratic governance persists, but its foundations are increasingly fragile.”

Peruvian democracy is relatively young. Since the resignation of former dictator Alberto Fujimori in November 2000, the country has embarked on a democratic transition. However, over the past eight years, this transition has been continuously tested. In less than a decade, Peru has had six presidents, faced an attempted self-coup, and endured a social crisis that left 28 dead in the 2022 protests and 48 in 2023, without any political accountability being established. Although elections remain free and competitive, civil rights have deteriorated, and political impunity has reached levels bordering on authoritarianism.

Peru is the most extreme case of party disintegration in Latin America. The 2021 presidential election highlighted this fragmentation: eighteen parties fielded candidates, reflecting the absence of strong party structures and electoral opportunism. The institutional crisis is undeniable. While parties multiply without consolidating, public trust in political institutions is collapsing. Congress and the Presidency have record levels of disapproval, and disillusionment with representative democracy has deepened. Citizens perceive their leaders as ineffective and corrupt, fuelling support for anti-system rhetoric and authoritarian solutions, further weakening the country’s democratic stability.

To address these failures, Peru embarked on a frantic race for reform. “Reform” became a recurring slogan for candidates, legislators, and decision-makers. However, these modifications have been irregular, drastic, and, in many cases, contradictory. Between 1975 and 2022, the country made 75 changes to its electoral laws, 47 of which were radical alterations affecting key processes such as party registration, candidate selection, and voting methods. Despite this hyper-reformism, the results have been counterproductive: instead of strengthening parties and reducing their number, the system has become even more fragmented, with 42 parties registered for the 2026 elections.

One of the reasons for the failure of these reforms lies in Congress itself, which has distorted any attempt at change. A paradigmatic case is the High-Level Commission for Political Reform in 2019. This team of experts, convened by then-President Martín Vizcarra, proposed 12 comprehensive reforms to the government and electoral system. Among the most significant were the introduction of open, simultaneous, and mandatory primaries; the implementation of gender parity and alternation in congressional and subnational election lists; and stricter control over party financing.

Of all these reforms, only gender parity and alternation were fully implemented in 2021. However, in 2024, horizontal parity in election lists was eliminated, marking a clear regression. Even more alarming has been the deregulation of political financing. Following the Odebrecht corruption scandal, which implicated most of Peru’s former presidents, it was crucial to reform this aspect to prevent future corruption cases. Nevertheless, Congress chose to weaken financial oversight of parties even further.

On January 31, a reform to the political organizations law was enacted, introducing troubling changes. Now, undeclared funds within permitted limits are no longer presumed to be of illegal origin, effectively nullifying the purpose of financing caps. Additionally, if contributions are made through the Nation Bank, donor confidentiality is maintained, effectively allowing anonymous funding.

Instead of correcting its institutional weaknesses, Peru continues to deepen its crisis. A semblance of democratic governance persists, but its foundations are increasingly fragile. The question remains: how long can it endure?